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Abstract—Ensuring seamless coverage accounts for the lion’s
share of the energy consumed in a mobile network. Overlapping
coverage of three to five mobile network operators (MNOs)
results in enormous amount of energy waste which is avoidable.
The traffic demands of the mobile networks vary significantly
throughout the day. As the offered load for all networks are not
same at a given time and the differences in energy consumption
at different loads are significant, multi-MNO capacity/coverage
sharing can dramatically reduce energy consumption of mobile
networks and provide the MNOs a cost effective means to
cope with the exponential growth of traffic. In this paper, we
propose an energy saving market for a multi-MNO network
scenario. As the competing MNOs are not comfortable with
information sharing, we propose a double auction clearinghouse
market mechanism where MNOs sell and buy capacity in order to
minimize energy consumption. In our setting, each MNO proposes
its bids and asks simultaneously for buying and selling multi-
unit capacities respectively to an independent auctioneer, i.e.,
clearinghouse and ends up either as a buyer or as a seller in each
round. We show that the mechanism allows the MNOs to save
significant percentage of energy cost throughout a wide range of
network load. Different than other energy saving features such as
cell sleep or antenna muting which can not be enabled at heavy
traffic load, dynamic capacity sharing allows MNOs to handle
traffic bursts with energy saving opportunity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current trend indicates that the global mobile data traffic
will keep growing exponentially and will increase 11 times by
2018 compared to what it was in 2013 [1]. The corresponding
increase in energy consumption is untenable from business per-
spective as it is understood that the revenue from meeting this
extra capacity demand will not increase significantly or may
not increase at all. This revenue gap poses a huge challenge
to the MNOs to come up with sustainable business models.
Business viability as well as environmental awareness calls for
system and solutions that can cater high capacity demand with
manifold increase in energy efficiency. As network load varies
throughout the day (i.e., the daily maximum are even 2 − 10
times higher than the daily minimums) and the variation of
load demands among the MNOs serving the same geographical
area is significant [2], the MNOs can utilize this load behavior
in their favor if they share capacity. Multi-MNO capacity
sharing can be a cost-effective and necessary means to restrain
energy consumption to support exponential traffic growth.
However, this necessitates redefining the relations among the
regulator and competing MNOs.
Recently, energy efficiency in wireless network has gar-
nered significant attention and different solutions have been
proposed. There are numerous studies that suggest dynamic
cell range so that a portion of the network can be switched
off when network load becomes low [3], [4]. However, it is
very difficult to maintain proper coverage while sending a set
of base stations (BSs) offline or in sleep mode.
Mobile data offloading is another viable option in order
to cope with the increasing traffic demands and to refrain
from additional capacity deployment. Many studies [5]–[7]
demonstrated the benefit of Wi-Fi offloading. However, [8]
has shown that the total energy consumed by a network for
data transmissions is in the single digit percentage and the
rest is mainly consumed by the BSs to ensure coverage. As a
result, offloading to only Wi-Fi does not improve the situation
much unless all data can be offloaded and the BS switched
off. Deployment of small cells is also not that effective for the
same reason. Further complementing cost and energy saving
mechanisms are required.
Different forms and modes of multi-MNO sharing have
been discussed recently. The proposals range from sharing few
sub-carriers to sharing everything, e.g., infrastructure, spec-
trum, capacity. In [9]–[11], cooperation among multi-MNOs
has been suggested in order to accomplish greener operation. In
[9], it has been suggested that the MNOs can cooperate during
off-peak hours and reduce energy cost by shutting down one
MNO through offloading its users to the other MNO. In [10],
under game-theoretic framework, formation of stable coalitions
among MNOs has been proposed in order to maintain QoS
and reduce energy consumption by sharing both users and
BSs. In [11], different possibilities including cell switching
off and inter-MNO cooperation has been discussed. However,
the MNOs may consider their information sensitive and not
be willing to share with their competitors. As a result, a
collaborative scheme that requires sharing of information is
difficult to be implemented in reality.
Double auction (DA) is an appropriate mechanism for a
scenario in which the number of both sellers and buyers
are more than one and none of them is willing to reveal
information about demand and supply. Sellers compete with
each other in order to attract buyers and the buyers compete
among themselves and can offer bids for some or all the
sellers. Normally, an independent auctioneer collects the bids
and asks from the buyers and sellers respectively, selects the
winning sellers and buyers, allocates the items from the sellers
to the buyers and determines prices from the buyers to the
sellers [12]. DA has been proposed extensively in wireless
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Fig. 1. Energy cost for one MNO vs. offered traffic load, normalized to the
feasible load for one BS.
networks as the mechanism to solve different problems, e.g.,
power and spectrum allocation, spectrum sharing for both
intra-MNO and inter-MNO setting [5], [13], [14]. We adopt
this mechanism in order to design a multi-MNO energy saving
market.
In this paper, we investigate the energy saving potential by
allowing the MNOs to trade capacity by establishing an energy
market. The motivation behind this is to utilize the existing
capacity of the MNOs to the fullest in order to minimize
energy consumption. Under this mechanism, the MNOs utilize
the free capacity of their competitors by traffic offloading and
achieve mutual benefits as the cost function for accommodating
excess traffic is convex and the utility function of the traffic
offloading is concave [5], [15]. The networks are interference
limited at busy hour and energy consumption increases almost
exponentially when the network load approaches to the peak.
However, the difference in energy consumption for serving an
extra unit of traffic at different loading condition is significant
as shown in Figure 1. Let the current offered load of MNO A
be L1 and MNO B be L2. The bid and ask by the MNO A for
x unit has been shown in the Figure 1. Note that by offloading
x unit of load, energy savings achieved by MNO A is larger
than the energy cost conceded by MNO B to serve that extra
x unit.
As a result, there is an economic viability to share capacity.
This capacity sharing also allows MNOs to be less stringent
with over dimensioning in order to handle the bursty traffic
demand during the busy hours. On the other hand, at low load,
one or more MNOs can offload totally and go offline or to a
deep sleep mode and save significant amount of energy (e.g.,
see Figure 1). As the MNOs are not willing to reveal their
confidential information, we propose a clear-house DA as the
market mechanism. Numerical results suggest that the energy
saving potential is significant at low to medium load. Also,
the amount of energy saved during busy hour is considerable,
especially, when one or two MNOs are highly loaded compared
to other MNOs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we provide the system model. In Section III, we present
the energy saving market. In Section IV, we illustrate the
numerical analysis. Our paper closes with a conclusion and
future work in Section V.
II. MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Consider the down-link of M MNOs whose serving areas
are overlapping in the same geographical area and each MNO
consist of a set K = {1, 2, ...K} of cells. A BS serves only
one cell, hence BS and cell is used interchangeably hereafter.
Each BS is assumed to have its own power amplifier (PA).
We consider that each BS is similarly loaded and hence the
central cell represents the network of an MNO. However, while
calculating interference for the central cell, interference from
all the neighboring cells of its own MNO has been accounted
for. We model the BS as a single server processor sharing (PS)
queue, i.e., M/G/1-PS queue that serves the users in one-
by-one fashion. For simplicity, we divide space into discrete
locations. Let u ∈ Ck denote the location of any user in the
finite set of locations Ck in the cell k ∈ K. Flows are generated
in the BS with rate λu packets per second and packet size
Su for the location u. The transmission rate for the user at
location u, ru is a function of the BS transmit power p and
the interference received, Iu. The service time for a packet
at location u is xu = Sur−1u . Let PPA denote the total power
consumed by the PA of the BS for the fixed downlink transmit
power p. Note that we do not consider any downlink power
control which is inline with current technology, LTE. The
consumed power other than the PA consumption during the
transmission and during the idle state is denoted by Pc and
Pidle respectively.
The energy consumed to transmit a packet at location u is
etx(Su) = (PPA + Pc)xu
The total energy consumption for serving offered load, L =∑
u Suλu including the energy consumed during idle time
etot(L) =
∑
u∈C
λuetx(Su) +
(
1−
∑
u∈C
λuxu
)
Pidle
=
∑
u∈C
λuSu
PPA + Pc − Pidle
ru
+ Pidle (1)
where
∑
u∈C
λuSu
ru
< 1 is the queue stability constraint. Note
that the fraction of time the server is busy, i.e.,
∑
u∈C
λuSu
ru
,
is the activity of a BS and is coupled among BSs due
to the dependence of achieved rate on received interference
from neighboring cells. The activity is determined through an
iterative process. For a given offered load, in order to calculate
the activity of a cell, the activity of all other interfering BSs
are initialized as 1, i.e., BSs are considered always active. The
iterations are carried out until the activity of all cells converges.
A. Power amplifier
The traditional power amplifier (TPA) is characterized by
high efficiency only close to its compression region [16]. The
required input power for mean transmit power level equal to
p ≤ pmax is
PPA(p) =
1
ηmax
√
p · pmax,PA (2)
ηmax denotes the maximum PA efficiency while delivering
maximum PA output power, pmax,PA. Note that for modern
technologies, e.g., CDMA,OFDM, maximum average transmit
power of a BS ( i.e., pmax ) needs to be around 8 dB less than
pmax,PA due to high peak to average power ratio (PAPR).
B. Aggregate interference model and transmission rate
We consider log-normal shadow fading and we employ the
Fenton-Wilkinson approximation method as in [17] in order
to model the aggregate interference level in the slow fading
environment. In the downlink, the locations of the interfering
BS are fixed. The mean and variance of the aggregate interfer-
ence received by a mobile terminal (MT) at a location can be
found at [17, Eq. (29), Eq. (30)]. For modeling the transmission
rate we consider that the users can adapt their modulation and
coding scheme so that they can reach the Shannon capacity
bound.
III. MNO ENERGY MARKET
This energy market models the trading of network capacity
among the cellular MNOs in order to minimize the network
energy consumption. One particular key feature of our energy
market is that each MNO submits both bids, i.e., offers to
buy and asks, i.e., offers to sell simultaneously to a DA
clearinghouse with the view to maximize their profit. The
MNOs participate in the auction repeatedly and in a single
round an MNO is allowed either to buy or sell. The MNOs
are expected to submit offers for multi-unit capacities and
corresponding differentiated prices. In each round, the MNOs
revise their bids and asks based on their current offered loads.
There are some parameter values for each MNO, e.g., the unit
of load it wants to trade and the anticipated trade price. The
values of these parameters are private to each MNO and hidden
from each other. The clearinghouse collects the bids and asks
from each MNO and matches them following its criterion to
minimize total energy consumption, determines the winning
buyer and seller MNOs, trade price and quantity.
In order to generate the bid to offload a unit of offered
load, an MNO determines how much energy it can save by
offloading that unit. Similarly, to generate the asks it calculates
the energy cost it suffers while accommodating that additional
unit. The clearinghouse use Preston McAfees DA (PMD)
protocol to determine the trade price, ptrade [18] and allocation
process. In order to use this protocol we consider each unit of
load as a single item and each ask or bid from the same MNO
are considered as an independent bid or ask. The reason behind
using PMD protocol is that it has the properties of being i)
dominant-strategy incentive compatible, i.e., truthful bidding is
the best strategy for the bidders, ii) budget balanced: auctioneer
ends up with non-negative payments and iii)individual rational:
bidders do not get worse by participating. However, PMD
cannot always ensure maximum social welfare, i.e., efficiency
as will be described later. Note that no double auction mech-
anism can ensure all these properties and other DA protocols
yield similar results in this study. In PMD protocol, bids (b)
and asks (a) are arranged in descending and ascending order
respectively. Then lowest bid, bj is identified such that bj ≥ aj
and bj+1 < aj+1. The trade price that clears the market is
determined as
ptrade =
1
2
(bj+1 + aj+1) (3)
If bj ≥ ptrade ≥ aj , the traded quantity is j and if bj ≤ ptrade
or ptrade ≤ aj , the traded quantity is j−1. The winning buyer
for the last unit pays bj and the winning seller for the last unit
receives aj .
A. Bid generation
For traditional goods, the marginal utility diminishes with
the increase of quantity. By offloading data an MNO saves
a part of the dynamic energy, PPA, required to support that
amount of data. This potential of energy saving decreases
with the increase of offloaded amount. However, if the MNO
can offload totally, it can save the static part of the energy
(i.e. Pidle) by completely shutting down or going to deep
sleep mode. This fact leads to a particular bidding from the
MNOs which keep decreasing with each extra unit of capacity
followed by a drastic increase of total offer when it bids for
total offloading. The bid for m-th unit of excess capacity
offered by i-th MNO can be given by
bi,m =
{
etot(Li,m)− etot(Li,m−1)− etr : ∆l < Li,m
where Li,m−1 = Li,m − ∆l, etot(Li,m) is the energy
consumption of the network with load Li,m and etot(Li,m−1)
is the energy consumption of the network when it offloads
unit offered load, ∆l. etr gives the energy consumed while
offloading the traffic to the target MNO. The energy for zero
load is given by Psleep and for total offloading case, the bid
for total offloading equals the total energy required to serve
current load. We consider Psleep = 0 in this study.
B. Ask generation
Similar to bidding process, in order to generate the asks,
the MNOs calculate how much excess energy cost is suffered
by conceding the load from the other MNOs. Note that the
excess energy required to support the excess traffic depends
on the current load the network is serving. Also, as shown
in Figure 1, asks for conceding a unit of excess traffic keep
increasing. We denote the ask by MNO i for the n-th unit of
offered load as ain such that
ain = etot(Li,n+1)− etot(Li,n) + etr (4)
where Li,n+1 = Li,n + ∆l, etot(Li,n+1) is the energy
consumption of the network with offered load Li,n+1 and
etot(Li,n) is the energy consumption of the network with
offered load Li,n. Note that ai,n < ai,n+1.
C. Clearinghouse mechanism
The target of the auctioneer is to achieve the socially opti-
mal allocation, i.e., minimization of total energy consumption
in the service area. In order to find the optimal unit of offloaded
traffic, P and received excess traffic, Q by the buying and
selling MNOs, respectively, clearinghouse needs to solve the
following social welfare maximization problem:
Maximize :
P,Q
∑
i
Bimpim −
∑
i
Ainqin (5i)
Subject to:
∑
m
pim +
∑
n
qin ≤ 1, ∀i (5ii)
∑
i
∑
m
mpim =
∑
i
∑
n
nqin. (5iii)
where Ain =
∑
n ain is the total ask for n units of ca-
pacity submitted by MNO i, Bim =
∑
m bi,m is the bid
for offloading m units of traffic by MNO i. This objective
function corresponds to total energy savings. pi,m ∈ {0, 1}
and qi,n ∈ {0, 1} are the decision variables where pim denotes
whether (pim = 1) or not (pim = 0) m unit of capacity has
been allocated for MNO i. Constraint (5ii) ensures that an
MNO ends up only as a buyer or seller and constraint (5iii)
makes sure that total amount sold are equal to total amount
bought. As the number of MNOs covering same geographical
area is small (i.e. 2 − 5) in reality, solving this problem by
brute force is not computationally demanding.
There are possible
∑n−1
i=1 Cn,i = 2
n − 2 combination of
MNO that can offload totally. For each combination first we
i) update the asks by excluding the own asks of the offloading
MNOs ii) arrange the bids in descending and the asks in
ascending order iii) check if there are enough valid (i.e., bid
is higher than the corresponding ask) asks. In the second step,
PMD protocol is used to complete the allocation process and
determining the trade price, ptrade from the rest of the bids
and asks. Finally, we combine the allocations and choose the
combination that maximizes (5i). We update the allocation
vectors P and Q. However, if no MNO can offload totally, we
simply use PMD protocol to make the allocation and determine
trade price as described earlier. We provide the pseudocode of
the algorithm to find the allocation vectors, P,Q and trade
price, ptrade.
An MNO never shows up as both winning bidder and
winning seller in the same round. Due to the exponential
increase in energy cost, as shown in Figure 1, at any offered
load, the ask for the first unit of an MNO is higher than it’s
bid for any unit except in the case of total offloading when
the load becomes 0. Therefore total offloading has been taken
care of in the first part of the allocation process.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We consider the network of each MNO consisting of 19
regular hexagonal cells where wrap around technique has been
employed to avoid border effects. We also assume that the
BSs of different MNOs are co-located and traffic distribu-
tion is homogenous in the coverage area. Hence, the energy
Algorithm 1 Clearinghouse Algorithm
1: Set of MNOs, SO
2: Sets of offloading MNOs SB ← {S1, S2, S3...SK}
3: Sets of capacity selling MNOs SAk = SO \ Sk, k =
1, ...,K , SA ← {SA1, SA2, ..., SAK}
4: Sets of bids for the subsets ofSB from bi,m
5: B ← {b1, b2, ..., bK}, bk = the bids for the MNOs, Sk
6: Sets of asks for the subsets ofSA from ai,n
7: A← {a1, a2...aK} ak = valid asks for the MNOs, Sk
8: SI ⊂ SB where 1-norm ||bi||1 > ||ai||1 and cardinality
|ai| ≥ |bi|
9: if ∃SI then
10: Welfare ← 0
11: for all SI do
12: Use PMD for rest of the bids, b′i,m and asks, a
′
in
13: Allocation vectors P , Q for winner traders
14: Temp ← Evaluate (5i) given P and Q
15: if Temp > Welfare then
16: Welfare ← Temp, Print P , Q
17: end if
18: end for
19: else
20: Use PMD protocol for all bids bi,m and all asks ai,n
21: Allocation vector P , and Q for winner traders
22: end if
consumption in the central cell represents the average energy
consumption of the network. A grid of 64 points emulating the
possible locations of users is generated inside each cell. As the
energy required for processing packets at the BS is negligible,
we consider the power consumed during idle mode and the
static energy consumption during transmission as equal, i.e.,
Pc = Pidle. For TPA we use Pidle = 58.6W as derived in [19]
based on the values given in [20]. The parameter settings for
a network are summarized in the Table I.
With the parameters provided in the Table I, we find the cost
function for generating each extra unit of traffic by a network
in Figure 1. From this figure one can see that network energy
cost remains relatively low even up to 80% load. As a result
a network can accommodate excess traffic from other MNOs
without suffering much energy cost while operating on a wide
range of its load. On the other hand, the energy saving potential
is very high when the network can offload a fraction of its load
when it is serving peak load.
A. Energy saving potential at low to medium load
In order to get some first insight into the energy saving
potential by capacity sharing, we consider the loads of each
MNO to be the same. From the Figure 2, one can see that
the energy saving potential is significant if the networks are
not highly loaded. When the network loads are low to medium,
energy is saved from total offload of one or more MNOs. When
the network loads are very high it does not give opportunity
to offload any MNO totally and hence the energy saving
potential ceases to exist. Another important observation is
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Reference parameters
Parameter Value
Number of cells 19
Grid size inside each cell 64 points
Cell radius 1 km
PA maximum output power, pmax,PA 53 dBm
Maximum average BS transmit power, p 46 dBm
Maximum PA efficiency at pmax,PA 80%
Path loss exponent 3.6
Shadow fading standard deviation 5.5 dB
Bandwidth 20 MHz
Noise level -106 dBm
Target outage 10%
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Fig. 2. Energy saving potential by totall offloading of MNOs
that the energy saving potential increases with the number of
MNOs involved in capacity sharing. With only two MNOs,
maximum energy saving potential is around 50% whereas with
five MNOs it jumps to 80%. The reason behind this is that
if number of MNOs involved is bigger, more MNOs can be
totally offloaded at low load. Also, for bigger number of MNOs
involved, e.g., 5, it is possible to save energy by total offloading
even at high loading condition of the networks. The drastic fall
of energy saving potential happens when an MNO need to be
activated from sleep mode due to the increase in total load.
B. Energy saving potential at high load
When the networks are highly loaded, it is not possible
to completely offload any MNO. In such case, the capacity
trading only helps the comparatively highly loaded MNOs to
offload a fraction of their load and save from the dynamic part
of the energy consumption, i.e., PPA. In Table II, we present
the energy saving potential when five MNOs share loads with
some combinations of high loads. From the first two rows,
one can observe that the percentage of energy saving potential
becomes low with the combination of loads when no MNO
TABLE II
ENERGY SAVING AT HIGH LOAD 2
Operators load (%) Saving(%)
90 90 85 65 60 2
95 90 80 70 70 3
80 80 80 70 50 9
85 70 70 60 50 16
99 99 99 70 50 18
can offload totally. The next two rows show higher saving
percent as it is possible to offload at least one MNO at these
moderate high loads. Note that although the percentage saving
in energy consumption is comparatively low in case of very
high network load, the actual amount of energy savings is
considerable as energy consumption while serving high load is
much higher. The last row shows high energy saving potential
if the network load of one or two MNOs are extremely high
and others are moderate. Although the networks do not operate
with this extreme high loads, the main motivation of presenting
these results is that with dynamic capacity sharing, the network
dimensioning can be less stringent to cater the bursty highest
load demand. MNOs dimension their network based on their
busy hour traffic demand. As a result they end up with huge
excess capacity for most of the time of the day. If multi-
MNO capacity sharing is allowed, MNOs can reduce their
CAPEX by avoiding overdimensiong and still maintain QoS
by taking advantage of the spatial and temporal variation of
load demands among themselves.
From the numerical analysis, we also observe that if etr is
ignored, the networks become equally loaded after the trading
of loads. This implies that balancing the loads among the
MNOs is the appropriate strategy to minimize energy when
considering equally loaded networks. In [21], it has been
shown that a BS can go to sleep by offloading existing users
to other cells in around 30 seconds. However, the frequency of
auction round will also depend on the time required for some
meaningful change in the network load dynamics.
V. CONCLUSION
Efficient utilization of existing resources is a prerequisite
in order to contain the operation cost of the MNOs, especially
when they are going to handle data avalanche with almost zero
marginal revenue. By adopting appropriate mechanism and
policy, e.g., national roaming, multi-MNO capacity sharing,
it is possible to reduce network cost and inflict less harm to
the environment by reducing CO2 emission. In this paper, we
have shown that double auction is a suitable mechanism for
multi-MNO capacity sharing as it does not require sharing
of private information. The energy saving potential has been
found to be very high at low to medium load where one or
more MNOs can be offloaded totally. Also, at high loads,
considerable amount of energy can be saved if there is good
gap among the MNOs loads. It was also observed that for
symmetric networks, energy efficient allocation balances load
among the MNOs. In this work, we focused on the energy cost
and did not consider quality of service (QoS) when generating
bids and asks. However, QoS can be easily incorporated in
the process. Our assumption of co-located BSs is also the
worst case scenario as connecting to a closer BS requires
less energy to transfer same amount of data. Also, we did
not consider spatial variation of network load. For future work
spatial variation of network load can be considered which will
allow cell level offloading.
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